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Abstract 
This paper assesses the incentive and award fee contracting training and experiences gained 
by the Department of Defense (DoD) Acquisition Workforce (DAW) through the 
implementation of various incentive arrangements to influence more favorable performance 
outcomes. The researchers developed a model to measure current and expected gaps 
between training, experience and knowledge. Additionally, the model correlates training and 
experience with knowledge and correlates training and experience with performance 
outcomes. The researchers used a survey instrument that included 30 questions to capture 
observations and assessments of the DAW who attended advanced classes between the 
period of 2013 and 2015. The survey provided key data to determine the presence of any 
noticeable gaps between required and actual levels of training, experience and knowledge. 
Introduction 
Part 16 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) describes a wide variety of 
contract types that may be used for the acquisition of goods and services using appropriated 
funds in the Federal Government. The contract types primarily vary according to (1) 
responsibilities assumed by the contractor for costs of performance and (2) profit incentives 
for achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals. The contract types are grouped into 
two broad categories: “fixed-price” and “cost-reimbursement.” The contract types range from 
“firm-fixed-price,” where the contractor has full responsibility for performance costs and 
profits, to “cost-plus-fixed-fee,” where the contractor is allocated minimal responsibility for 
performance costs with the fee (or profit) fixed by the terms of the contract. In between these 
two extremes are various “incentive” contract types, where the contractor’s responsibility for 
the performance costs and profit are adjusted depending on the actual results of specific 
uncertainties identified at the time of contract award. Tables 1 and 2 present a summary of 
the FAR descriptions for three primary fixed-price type contracts and three cost-
reimbursement type contracts. 
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 Summary of Fixed Price Contract Types 
 
Background 
In September 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) in his Better Buying Power (BBP) initiative memos clearly expressed, 
as a matter of policy, the importance of properly choosing contract types as a way of 
“aligning the incentives of the government and contractor” (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2010). While the 
September 2010 memo BBP 1.0 emphasized the increased use of Fixed-Price Incentive 
Firm Target type contracts, BBP 2.0 refined the guidance by emphasizing the use of the 
“appropriate contract vehicle for the product or services being acquired” (e.g., “one size 
does not fit all”) and also “focus[ed] on improving the training of management and 
contracting personnel in the appropriate use of all contract types” (OUSD[AT&L], 2012). 
More recently, in BBP 3.0, there was even more refined guidance: “Employ appropriate 
contract types, but increase the use of incentive type contracts” (OUSD[AT&L], 2015a). 
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 FAR Summary of Cost Plus Contract Types 
 
In a report entitled Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2015 Annual 
Report, dated September 16, 2015, the OUSD(AT&L) concluded “that incentive contracts 
(cost-plus-incentive-fee and fixed-price-incentive) control cost, price, and schedule as well 
as, or better than, other types—and with generally lower yet fair margins” (OUSD[AT&L], 
2015b).  
Prior to the September 2010 BBP memo cited above, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO; 2005) reported that the Department of Defense (DoD) had paid billions in 
award fees regardless of acquisition outcomes. The GAO (2005) audits stated the award fee 
criteria were subjective and faulty, resulting in fees awarded for marginal performance.  
Even though a number of corrective actions were implemented, they still failed to 
address a key area of training and experience in the application of incentive arrangements. 
The report by the GAO stated the guidance on Award Fees has led to better practices but is 
not consistently applied for the DoD. The audit report also addressed the following topics: 
programs that paid fees without holding contractors accountable for achieving desired 
acquisition outcomes, such as meeting cost and schedule goals and delivering desired 
capabilities, and programs that paid contractors a significant portion of the available fee for 
what award fee plans describe as “acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory" 
performance when the purpose of these fees is to motivate excellent performance.  
The shortfalls of incentive contract arrangements are well documented in two GAO 
studies (GAO, 2005, 2009) and other literature. They address the areas of cost control, 
schedule, management, and technical performance. Generally, contractors who fail to meet 
incentive-related goals also frequently fail to meet other terms and conditions of the 
contract, which if structured properly, would carry performance penalties. Some of the 
shortcomings seen in the application of incentive contracts led to several clarifications from 
senior leadership in the DoD, including additional amplification of what’s important in the 
BBP. All too often, the contractors continue to earn high fee levels on late or cost over runs 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 422 - 
because the criteria tends to be overly subjective and the outcomes are not always well 
written with clear and equivocal objective outcomes. This could be a result of a knowledge 
shortfall, ineffective training, and/or inexperience. However, no research has been 
conducted to look more closely at the root cause of the problem in incentive contracting. 
This study hypothesized that knowledge, experience, and training could be contributing to 
the root cause, impeding the appropriate use of contract types to include incentive type 
arrangements.  
This research began with the development of a Research Model that accounts for 
the variables that contribute to incentive arrangement failures. The research pursuit is 
intended to help the DoD better understand the level of experience, knowledge and training 
required for the effective application of incentive contract arrangements. The researchers 
leveraged the Kirkpatrick Learning Model (Figure 1), specifically Levels II–Learning, III–
Behavior, and IV–Results. 
 
 Kirkpatrick Evaluation Model 
Kirkpatrick’s four levels of evaluation consist of  
 Step 1: Reaction—How well did the learners like the learning process? 
 Step 2: Learning—What did they learn? (the extent to which the learners 
gain knowledge and skills) 
 Step 3: Behavior—What changes in job performance resulted from the 
learning process? (capability to perform the newly learned skills while on the 
job) 
 Step 4: Results—What are the tangible results of the learning process in 
terms of reduced cost, improved quality, increased production, efficiency, 
etc.? 
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Research suggests that as much as 90% of training resources are spent on the 
design, development, and delivery of training events, yet only yield 15% on-the-job 
application (Brinkerhoff, 2006). The learning reinforcement that occurs after the training 
event actually produces the highest level of learning effectiveness, followed by activities that 
occur before the learning event. 
Research Model 
Training Effectiveness Model 
The Training Effectiveness Model (Figure 2), would assess if Knowledge, Training, 
and Experience gaps exist among Contracting Officers, Contract Specialists, Acquisition 
Professionals, Program Managers, and Deputy Program Managers. The primary focus of 
this research is to better understand the experiences (H1A and H2A) gained through the 
management of various incentive arrangements and determine if gaps exist in experience 
levels, and whether these gaps have a potential causal relationship with programmatic 
performance. Training received through the DAU and other training (H1B and H2B) were 
used to determine the presence of any substantiated gaps and their influence on 
performance outcomes. A gap analysis would confirm the disparity between current and 
required levels of knowledge, training, and experience to achieve desired performance 
outcomes performance. For Hypothesis 2, a correlation was used to determine the strength 
of the relationship between experience and training and its potential causal relationship to 
knowledge. A gap analysis and correlation was also conducted to determine the strength of 
knowledge supported by training and experience. 
 
 Knowledge, Experience, and Training Effectiveness Model 
A Knowledge Gap is defined as the difference between what Acquisition 
professionals from the Program Management (PM) and Contracts Management (CM) 
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communities observed as the current knowledge levels and the ideal or desired knowledge 
level. A Knowledge gap was measured by the absolute difference of the arithmetic mean of 
the observed or current knowledge level and the required knowledge level in the context of 
incentive and award fee contracts. 
A Training Gap is defined as the difference between what the Acquisition 
professionals from the PM and CM communities observed as current training level and the 
ideal or desired training level. A Training gap is measured by the absolute difference of the 
arithmetic mean of the observed or current training level and the desired or required training 
level in the context of incentive and award fee contracts. 
An Experience Gap is defined as the difference between what the Acquisition 
professionals from the PM and CM communities observed as their current experience levels 
and the ideal or desired experience level. An Experience gap is measured by the absolute 
difference of the arithmetic mean of the observed or current experience level and the 
desired or required experience level in the context of incentive and award fee contracts. 
Performance is the overall effectiveness of the acquisition professional as perceived 
by the Program Managers and Contracting Officer groups. Performance is defined by the 
eight generic attributes (DoD, 2014) that program managers and contracting officers 
encounter with incentive and award fee contracts. The eight attributes are cost growth, 
program schedule, technical requirements, user requirements, technical issues, program 
risk, cost control, and contractor performance. The validation of the hypotheses of this 
research depended in part on the correlation analysis (at a minimally acceptable level of 
significance of at least .05 or p < 0.05) between the gaps or intervening variables and the 
incentive contracting performance. It is important to stress that a correlation coefficient of 
any magnitude or sign, regardless of statistical significance, does not imply causation 
(Emory & Cooper, 1991). However, the study explored the independent variables that might 
in some way influence performance outcomes. Consistent with the Kirkpatrick Evaluation 
Model, the DoD Acquisition Workforce survey volunteers provided useful information about 
themselves and their peers. The data centered on 
1. the Effectiveness of classroom training received by the respondent and its 
impact on job performance of incentive contracting (Level 2) 
2. job performance levels achieved, expected and targeted with respect to 
incentive and award fee contracting (Level 3) 
3. performance effects of perceived gaps in knowledge, training, and experience 
with respect to incentive and award fee contracting (Level 4) 
Research Methodology 
The intended population for this research included Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) students who completed the Program Management (PM) Office 
Course (PMT 352) and Contracting (CON) for Decision Making (CON 360) from each of the 
military services, DoD agencies and included support contractors between the period of 
October 2013 and December 2015. Two control groups were surveyed: a Program 
Management group consisting of Program Managers, Deputy Program Managers, and 
function acquisition leads; and the Contract Management group consisting of Procuring 
Contracting Officers, Administrative Contracting Officers, Contract Specialists, and contract 
support administrators/staff. A statistical analysis was performed to answer the following 
research questions: 
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Research Question 1 
What are the relationships among training gap, experience gap, and performance 
attributes that contribute to incentive contract arrangements among Defense Acquisition 
Workforce members in the contracting and program field?  
 Hypothesis 1: There are gaps in training and experience that affect 
performance attributes that contribute to incentive contract arrangements 
among Defense Acquisition Workforce members in the contracting and 
program field. 
o Hypothesis 1A: There is a reliable relationship among experience 
gaps and performance attributes among contracts and program 
managers. 
o Hypothesis 1B: There is a reliable relationship among training gaps 
and performance attributes among contracts and program managers. 
Research Question 2 
What are the relationships between training gaps, experience gaps, and knowledge 
gaps that contribute to incentive contract arrangements among Defense Acquisition 
Workforce members in the contracting and program field? 
 Hypothesis 2: There are differences in the relationships between training 
gaps, experience gaps, and knowledge gaps that contribute to incentive 
contract arrangements among Defense Acquisition Workforce members in 
the contracting and program field. 
o Hypothesis 2A: There is a reliable relationship among experience 
gaps and knowledge gaps among contracts and program managers. 
o Hypothesis 2B: There is a reliable relationship among training gaps 
and knowledge gaps among contracts and program managers. 
The researchers used a web-based survey consisting of 30 questions; 1,194 
individuals from the program management track responded, and 946 individuals from the 
contracting track responded. A Beta Testing of the survey instrument was conducted with 
the DAU West Contracting and PM Department faculty prior to the release of the survey. 
The researcher performed a Cronbach’s alpha coefficients assessment that resulted in a 
very high reliability value of 0.936, p < .05.  
Data Analysis 
This research measured the gaps and correlation relationship among knowledge, 
training, experience, and performance gap that exist in incentive and award fee contracts. 
This was accomplished by assessing the students’ current level of training, knowledge and 
the experience required to support incentive contract arrangements, compared to the level 
of knowledge, training, and experience required to achieve expected outcomes. Data from 
two population samples (i.e., PMs and CMs) identified the gaps.  
This research pursuit was based on empirical data in order to assess knowledge, 
training, and experience gaps that could be influencing the success or failure of incentive 
and award fee contract arrangements. This accompanying analysis required a systematic 
method that accurately described the relationships among the independent, dependent and 
intervening variables measured. 
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Descriptive correlation research was the most suitable choice to determine accuracy 
(Isaac & Michael, 1977). The variables of this study consisted of two independent variables, 
one intervening variable, and one dependent variable, as follows: 
Independent Variables 
 Observed vs. Required/Expected Incentive Contracts Experience Gaps 
 Observed vs. Required/Expected Incentive Contracts Training Gaps 
Intervening Variables 
 Observed vs. Required/Expected Incentive Contract Knowledge Gaps 
Dependent Variables 
 Performance Attributes 
Hypothesis 1: There are gaps in training and experience that affect performance attributes 
that contribute to incentive contract arrangements among Defense Acquisition Workforce 
members in the contracting and program field. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the knowledge, training, and experience 
gaps. It also shows the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation of each variable. The 
gaps for both the PM and CM were moderately strong at 3.8 to 4.3 on a 6-point Likert scale. 
The PMs and CMs indicated noticeable gaps in training, experience, and knowledge.  
 Descriptive Statistics for CM/PM Knowledge, Training, and Experience 
Gaps 
 
Table 4 shows the Pearson’s  analysis of the independent variable, training gap, 
and the dependent variable of performance by PMs. All nine performance attributes had a 
moderately low correlation that ranged from .359 to .441, p < .000. All of these correlations 
had a significant confidence level at the 0.01 level. 
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 Results of the Pearson’s  Correlation Between Program Managers 
Training Gap and Performance Attributes 
 
Table 5 shows the Pearson’s  analysis of the independent variable, training gap, 
and the dependent variable of performance by CMs. Cost growth indicated a very strong 
correlation of  = .934, p < .000. The remaining seven performance attributes had a 
moderately high correlation ranging from .592 to .717, p < .000. All of these correlations had 
a significant confidence level at the 0.01 level. 
 Results of the Pearson’s  Correlation Between Contracts Managers 
Training Gap and Performance Attributes 
 
Table 6 shows the Pearson’s r analysis of the independent variable, experience gap, 
and the dependent variable of performance by PMs. Cost growth indicated a moderately 
strong correlation  = .728, p < .000. The remaining seven performance attributes had a 
moderate correlation ranging from .466 to .584, p < .000. All of these correlations had a 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
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 Results of the Pearson’s  Correlation Between Program Managers 
Experience Gap and Performance Attributes 
 
Table 7 shows the Pearson’s  analysis of the independent variable, experience gap, 
and the dependent variable of performance by CMs. Program Risk indicated a strong 
correlation of  = .911, p < .000. The remaining seven performance attributes had a 
moderately strong correlation ranging from .782 to .894, p < .000. All of these correlations 
had a significance at the 0.01 level. 
 Results of the Pearson’s  Correlation Between Contracts Managers 
Experience Gap and Performance Attributes 
 
Table 8 shows a mean gap analysis of current and should be performance levels of 
incentive and award fee contracts by the CM respondents. The scale measures the various 
levels of understanding of outcomes that can be achieved through incentive arrangement. 
On a Likert scale of 1–6, 1 represents knowing the characteristics of an incentive 
arrangement, 2 represents understanding the benefits, 3 represents applying the 
mechanics, 4 represents analyzing the risks, 5 represents evaluating outcomes, and 6 
represents creating and developing suitable contracts.  
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 Results of a Mean Gap Analysis Between Contract Managers Current 
and Should Be Performance Level 
 
The CM respondents identified a gap greater than 1.0 for all four groups. The 
greatest gaps were contract specialists, with a 1.3590, and contracting officers, with a 
1.1619. The contracting officers could believe that among the contracting officers and 
contracting specialists, performance levels should result in more meaningful performance 
outcomes.  
Table 9 shows a mean gap analysis of current and should be performance levels of 
incentive and award fee contracts by the PM respondents. The PM respondents identified a 
gap greater than 1.0 for each of the groups. The greatest gaps were deputy program 
managers, with a 2.0384, and contract specialists, with a 1.4396. Program managers could 
believe that among deputy program managers and contract specialists, performance levels 
should result in more meaningful performance outcomes.  
 Results of a Mean Gap Analysis Between Program Managers Current 
and Should-Be Performance Level 
 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 10. The analysis 
was conducted with the independent variable of CM training means and dependent 
variables of performance attributes. The constant determines the overall effect of the 
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variables on the performance attributes. The multiplier R-value was 0.935, p < 0.000; and 
the multiple R-squared was 0.872, suggesting that the independent variable, CM training, 
explains the 93.52% of the variances in performance attributes. Multiple regression analysis 
was used to evaluate the strength of the relationship among the independent and dependent 
variables. The regression model summary and coefficients implies that CM training had a 
strong positive correlation with performance attributes. 
 Multiple Regression of CM Training as a Function of the Performance 
Attributes 
 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 11. The analysis 
was conducted using the independent variable of CM experience means and dependent 
variables of performance attributes. The constant determines the overall effect of the 
variables on the performance attributes. The multiplier R-value was 0.920, p < 0.000; and 
the multiple R-squared was 0.844, suggesting that the independent variable, PM 
experience, explains the 92.0% of the variances in performance attributes. Multiple 
regression analysis was used to evaluate the strength of the relationship among the 
independent and dependent variables. The regression model summary and coefficients can 
be interpreted that PM experience had a strong positive correlation with performance 
attributes.  
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 Multiple Regression of CM Experience as a Function of the Performance 
Attributes 
 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 12. The analysis 
was conducted using the independent variable of PM training means and dependent 
variables of performance attributes. The constant determines the overall effect of the 
variables on the performance attributes. The multiplier R-value was 0.450, p < 0.000; and 
the multiple R-squared was 0.203, suggesting that the independent variable, PM training, 
explains the 45.0% of the variances in performance attributes. Multiple regression analysis 
was used to evaluate the strength of the relationship among the independent and dependent 
variables. The regression model summary and coefficients imply that PM training has a 
weak positive correlation with performance attributes. 
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 Multiple Regression of PM Training as a Function of the Performance 
Attributes 
 
The results of the multiple regression analysis are shown in Table 13. The analysis 
was conducted considering the independent variable of PM experience means and 
dependent variables of performance attributes. The constant determines the overall effect of 
the variables on the performance attributes. The multiplier R-value was 0.730, p < 0.000; 
and the multiple R-squared was 0.534, suggesting that the independent variable, PM 
experience, explains the 73.0% of the variances in performance attributes. Multiple 
regression analysis was used to evaluate the strength of the relationship among the 
independent and dependent variables. The regression model summary and coefficients 
imply that PM experience has a moderately positive correlation with performance attributes. 
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 Multiple Regression of PM Experience as a Function of the Performance 
Attributes 
 
Hypothesis 2: There are differences in the relationships between training gaps, experience 
gaps, and knowledge gaps that contribute to incentive contract arrangements among 
Defense Acquisition Workforce members in the contracting and program field. 
 Hypothesis 2A: There is a reliable relationship among experience gaps and 
knowledge gaps among contracts and program managers. 
 Hypothesis 2B: There is a reliable relationship among training gaps and 
knowledge gaps among contracts and program managers. 
A Pearson’s Correlation (i.e., linear correlation) analysis was conducted between the 
training gaps, experience gaps, and the knowledge gaps and is recorded in Table 14. For 
CM knowledge gap and training gap, a strong correlation of 	 	0.898, 	 	0.000 is 
supported. CM knowledge gap and CM experience gap have a strong correlation of 	
	0.893, 	 	0.000. For program managers (PM) knowledge gap and training gap, a strong 
correlation of 	 	0.843, 	 	0.000 is supported. PM knowledge gap and CM experience 
gap have a strong moderate correlation of 	 	0.767, 	 	0.000. Pearson‘s 	correlation 
results for CM and PM training, experience, and knowledge gaps are presented in Table 14. 
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 Results of the Pearson’s  Correlation Between Training Gap, 
Experience Gap, and Knowledge Gap 
 
The multiple R-squared was 0.898 and .893, suggesting that the two independent 
variables, experience gap and training gaps, explain 89.8% and 89.3% of the variances in 
knowledge gap, respectfully.  
Multiple regression analysis was used to evaluate the strength of the relationship 
among the independent and dependent variables. The regression model summary and 
coefficients can be interpreted such that knowledge gap and experience gap have a strong 
positive correlation with knowledge gap. 
Table 15 shows the multiple regression of knowledge gap as a function of CM 
training gap and CM experience gap. There is a strong correlation between the variable of 
	 	 	 .925, 	 	0.000. This implies that when the CM training gap aligns with experience 
gaps, knowledge gap will be optimized. Hypothesis H2is supported for CM Training gaps, 
CM Experience gaps and Knowledge gaps. 
 Multiple Regression of Knowledge Gap as a Function of Training Gap 
and Experience Gap for the Contracting Group 
 
Table 16 shows the multiple regression of knowledge gap as a function of PM 
training gap and PM experience gap. There is a moderately strong correlation between the 
variable of 	 	 .785, 	 	0.000. This implies that when the PM training gap aligns with 
experience gap, knowledge gap will be moderately optimized. Hypothesis H2 is supported 
for PM Training Gaps, PM Experience gaps and Knowledge gaps. 
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 Multiple Regression of Knowledge Gap as a Function of Training Gap 




With respect to incentive contracting arrangements, 
 Moderate (self-assessed) gaps exist in knowledge, training and experience.  
 The experience gap, vice the training gap, is perceived to be more closely 
related to performance outcomes, and Contract Managers see training to be 
more closely related than do Program Managers. 
 Training and experience are highly correlated to knowledge. 
 The current state of skill-sets is more about the mechanics, while the desired 
state is more about creating and developing suitable contracts. 
 There are only a few significant differences between Contract Managers and 
Program Managers regarding assessments of knowledge, training, and 
experience. 
Discussion 
Both Program Manager and Contract Manager Respondents reported moderate 
knowledge, training, and experience gaps amongst their organization personnel who 
implement incentive contract arrangements.  
Knowledge associated with contractor incentives, and associated incentive 
contracting approaches and techniques, are necessary elements in addressing performance 
obstacles. Our research indicates that both Program Managers and Contract Managers 
perceive a strong relationship between both the observed training gap and experience gap 
to the observed knowledge gap.  
Our research suggests that experience, rather than training, is more closely identified 
with performance issues using incentive arrangements. More specifically, with a noted 
exception, respondents did not strongly relate the observed training gap as impacting skill-
sets needed to address acquisition obstacles (e.g., “Unexpected Cost Growth,” “Changes in 
Program Schedules,” “Changes in Technical Requirements,” “Changes in User 
Requirements,” Technical Issues,” and “Program Risk”). The exception was Contract 
Manager Respondents who more strongly identified the relationship between training gaps 
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and meeting performance challenges but reached the strongest only for the cost-related 
acquisition obstacles (e.g., “Unexpected Cost Growth” and “Cost Control”). 
Our survey asked Contract Managers (Contracting Officers and Contract Specialists) 
and Program Managers (Program Managers and Deputy Program Managers) to self-assess 
their “current” and “should be” levels of performance in working with incentive contract 
arrangements, thereby allowing visibility of any perceived gaps. Our research also asked 
Contract Managers and Program Managers to assess each other.  
Using a 6-point Likert scale, Contract Managers self-assessed themselves near the 
middle of the range and indicated they needed to increase performance levels, significantly 
from the current state. Program Manager assessments of Contract Manager performance 
level were very closely aligned with those of the Contract Manager self-assessments 
previously mentioned and corroborated what the research confirmed. 
The Program Manager self-assessments were very similar to both the Contract 
Managers’ self-assessments and the Contract Managers’ assessments of Program 
Managers except when it came to the assessment of Deputy Program Managers, where 
there was more than a 2-point gap (Current = 2.0 or “understands benefits,” while Should-be 
= 4.05 or “analysis of risks”).  
As expected, a strong relationship was noted between the observed training and 
experience gaps and knowledge gaps, suggesting that reducing training/experience gaps 
could also reduce any knowledge gaps.  
Qualitative Data  
The respondents provided over 6,000 comments, and the following is a 
representative sample of the strengths and/or shortcomings of the application of incentive 
contracts. 
Knowledge 
 “Contractor outcomes—profit/fee—were higher than they should have been 
because personnel routinely failed to hold contractors to the criteria found in 
the Award or Incentive plans.” 
 “I think people don’t want to use contract types they don’t fully understand.” 
 “I strongly believe that incentive contracts are necessary at my command and 
have recommended them after being brought on. It was acknowledged that 
this is the best contract type in the interest of our program, but overly 
complicated and burdensome given the lack of training of our staff.” 
 “KO was unable to write the outcomes to meet my program outcomes. I was 
pushed to use FFP or CPFF or IDIQ arrangements because KO did not fully 
understand the formation of award fee contracts.” 
 “Not sure all of my people are good at thinking through how different incentive 
structures will cause the contractor to behave. Incentives other than cost are 
particularly tricky and I generally shy away from them because I sense that 
the contractor will ‘outfox‘ us and we will end up regretting the structure down 
the road.” 
Training 
 “People had the training, but did not understand how to use it in their duties.” 
 “Most time is spent trying to apply mechanics of type rather than truly 
implementing meaningful measures.”  
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 “The biggest problem is developing meaningful criteria. Services acquisition 
are very hard to ‘incentivize.’ The wording of the meaningful criteria is the 
bigger problem than coming up with 10, 20, 30 percent incentive. That is 
simple math.”  
 “Because we don‘t have good command level training for how to administer 
these overly complex contracts, everyone struggles to efficiently do their 
work.”  
 “Lack of training is the biggest problem.” 
 “We do not receive enough training to understand these concepts enough to 
execute effectively.” 
Experience 
 “Experience is the main driver of shortfalls. Not everybody is in situations 
where they are using CPAF, FPIF, or CPIF contracts regularly.” 
 “This lack of experience, understanding and training makes it very difficult to 
effectively utilize these contract types.”  
 “Nobody seems to know what to do, if and when we use it and/or the required 
information is not passed to the field. 
 “Experience seems to drive individuals to contracts that they are familiar 
with.” 
 “Lack of experience with multiple contract types can cause under-
performance.” 
 “The lack of experience outs (place) the government at a disadvantage in 
execution of these types of contracts.” 
 “There’s just no substitute for experience, not IQ, not education. With 
experience comes intuition, and it’s intuition that recognizes what flies and 
what doesn’t. Oftentimes, people are thrust into programs and projects for 
which they lack a basis for making informed decisions about the future.” 
Recommendations  
1. Ensure incentive contract development training be reinvigorated for PMs and 
CMs to fully understand the fundamental principles and benefits of incentive 
contracts as well as provide a rigorous setting where they can practice 
designing incentive contracts and applying them.  
2. Identify the lessons learned from successful and unsuccessful incentive 
arrangements within the past 10 years and make them available across the 
defense acquisition workforce; incorporate these to the greatest extent 
possible into existing courseware. 
3. Produce an incentive and award fee guidebook that addresses the 
performance attributes identified in this study and address the question “How 
do I write an incentive arrangement?” to include incorporating performance 
attributes that lead to achievement of the PM’s goals and outcomes. 
4. Ensure the appropriate acquisition workforce qualification competencies (or 
any variation thereof) incorporate the key standards that address incentive 
and award fee contract proficiencies that are assignment specific.  
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5. Recommend that the Functional Integrated Product Team (FIPT) explore a 
wide range of competencies that are specifically tuned to the implementation 
of incentive arrangements for PMs and CMs in assignment specific positions.  
6. Conduct a follow on study to address the relationship between knowledge, 
performance, and the applicable regulations.  
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